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Abstract  
This study seeks to understand the factors influencing the adoption of an incident handling strategy by 
organisational cloud service users. We propose a conceptual model that draws upon the Situation 
Awareness (SA) model and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) to guide this research. 40 organisational 
cloud service users in Malaysia were surveyed. We also conduct face-to-face interviews with participants 
from four of the organisations. Findings from the study indicate that four PMT factors (Perceived 
Vulnerability, Self-Efficacy, Response Efficacy, and Perceived Severity) have a significantly influence on 
the adoption of cloud incident handling strategy within the organisations. We, therefore, suggest a 
successful adoption cloud incident handling strategy by organisational cloud service users involves the 
nexus between these four PMT factors. We also outline future research required to validate the model. 
Keywords  
Cloud computing, Incident handling, Protection Motivation Theory, Situation Awareness. 
Introduction 
Cloud computing has been highlighted as a key initiative in Malaysia’s Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) strategic plan with a number of projects funded to advance the development and 
deployment of cloud services among government agencies. In 2012, for example, the Multimedia 
Development Corporation (MDeC) of Malaysia launched a “Small Medium Enterprise (SME) Cloud 
Computing Adoption Programme”, and provided financial incentives to increase cloud adoption within 
the country (Multimedia Development Corporation 2012). In a more recent study by Asia Cloud 
Computing Association (ACCA), Malaysia ranks eighth in the Asia Pacific Cloud Readiness Index which 
measures 13 other countries cloud readiness (ACCA 2014). 
Migrating to cloud is not, however, without challenges, particularly for organisations and government 
agencies dealing with sensitive information such as those of their users and citizens respectively. Cloud 
and related security threats are real, as explained by scholars (Choo 2010; Quick et al. 2014) and 
highlighted in recent high profile incidents (European Parliament 2014; Federal Bureau of Investigation 
2014). Consequences range from national security breaches to loss of business (e.g. due to civil litigation 
and loss of competitive advantage) to embarrassment, and can result in substantial losses, both direct 
(e.g. financial) and indirect (e.g. reputational), to an organisation. A sound, proactive, and preferably 
evidence-based, strategy to handle and respond to a security incident must be taken into account when 
migrating to the cloud environment. This was also highlighted by the Cloud Security Alliance (2011). An 
incident handling strategy generally includes pre-incident, incident detection, incident analysis, 
containment, eradication and recovery (i.e. incident response) (Cichonski and Scarfone 2012; Killcrece 
2003).  
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There are, however, challenges in adapting a “traditional” incident handling strategy for the cloud due to 
the nature of the cloud infrastructure as explicated in a recent survey (Ab Rahman and Choo 2015a).  For 
example, Cloud Service Users (CSUs), including organisational CSUs, may not have easy access to 
information pertaining to a security breach or are unaware of a security breach involving their data, may 
have limited insight and knowledge about the underlying cloud architecture, and the uncertainty in roles 
and responsibilities for incident handler (Grobauer and Schreck 2010; Hooper et al. 2013; Lenkala et al. 
2013; Loske et al. 2014). The challenges are compounded by the (significant) variation between 
organisational CSUs and CSPs, as well as the underlying cloud architecture and deployment model (Ab 
Rahman and Choo 2015b). Despite the importance of incident handling, a survey of 23 European 
countries by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (2013) suggested that 
incident handling remains a concern for the majority of the surveyed countries. It is, therefore, necessary 
to understand what factors influence the adoption of cloud incident handling strategy by organisational 
CSUs – the objective of this study.  
To address the research objective, we propose a conceptual model which draws upon the Situational 
Awareness (Taylor 1990) Model and the Protection Motivation Theory (Maddux & Rogers 1983). This 
model is used as the underlying theoretical lens, and is described in the next section. We then describe the 
instrument design and data collection strategy, followed by the findings and avenues for future research.  
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
Situational Awareness (SA), the first underlying concept in this study, was first used in the aviation 
industry to collect different environmental data to facilitate dynamic decision-making (Taylor 1990). The 
analysis of a situation encompasses three increasing key levels introduced in a  latter seminal study by 
Endsley (1995), namely: perception, comprehension, and projection. As discussed by Endsley (1995), 
perception forms a basic set of knowledge of significant elements in the environment by obtaining 
information such as status, attributes, and dynamics of certain elements. Comprehension is regarded as 
people developing an understanding or awareness of the environment’s elements by combining, 
interpreting, storing, and retaining information. This will help one to subsequently perceive a situation 
and assess the level of knowledge, which leads to the Projection level. 
The second underlying concept of this study is the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), an extension of 
the Health Belief Model (Rogers 1975). PMT sets out to understand and clarify fear appeals  in order to 
change attitudes and behaviours and overcome fear (Maddux & Rogers 1983). There are two key 
components – threat appraisal and coping appraisal – in PMT. Threat appraisal refers to the assessment 
of the risk level posed by a threatening event, and consists of the following factors: 
i. Perceived vulnerability — individuals were believed to vary widely in their acceptance of personal 
susceptibility to a condition; and 
ii. Perceived severity — fears that a person has regarding the significance of a threat.  
The second component is coping appraisal, which is regarded as the assessment of one’s own ability to 
handle and prevent loss occurring from the threat (Ifinedo 2012; Maddux and Rogers 1983). The coping 
appraisal comprises three factors:  
i. Self-efficacy — the degree of confidence in an individual’s ability to execute an action successfully 
(Bandura 1977; Maddux and Rogers 1983);  
ii. Response efficacy — beliefs regarding the effectiveness of the various actions available in reducing 
the threat. It is expected that an individual would not be expected to accept the recommended 
action unless it was perceived as feasible and effective (Maddux & Rogers 1983; Rogers 1975); and 
iii. Response cost — the perceived opportunity costs in terms of money, time and effort expended 
when implementing the recommended behaviour (Ifinedo 2012). Some potential negative aspects 
(e.g. expensive, time-consuming, and dangerous) may act as barriers to a recommended action. 
 
The concept of SA has gained traction in the information security discipline from both technological and 
management perspectives. Motivated to provide effective Honeynet data analysis, for example, 
Yegneswaran et al. (2005) and Bing et al. (2012) demonstrated that SA is useful to facilitate one in 
classifying and summarising a dataset in a network security context. Zeng et al. (2014) and Webb et al. 
(2014)  demonstrated the potential for using cyber security SA as a basis for analysing the correlation 
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state machine data to obtain up-to-date cyber security information and knowledge, and the basis of an 
information security risk management cycle, respectively. In the context of incident handling, Skopik et 
al. (2012) and Murray and Ruefle (2014), applied SA in the incident response cycle of an Cyber Attack 
Information System, and as an organisational requirement in decision-making to prevent, detect and 
respond to information security threats and risks, respectively.  
PMT has also been studied in the information security (IS) discipline. Examples of study that seek to 
understand whether PMT factors can influence users’ security behaviour include those that examined IS 
behaviour (Claar and Johnson 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Ng et al. 2009), information seeking 
behaviour (Wang et al. 2012), and IS policy compliance (Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012; Siponen et 
al. 2014; Vance et al. 2012). In this study, we adapted the SA model and PMT factors in our conceptual 
model in order to measure the level of incident handling strategy adoption by organisational CSUs. In our 
model, the five PMT factors are grouped under the three levels of SA (Perception, Comprehension, 
Projection; see Table 1). The model also consists of five independent variables, namely: Perceived 
Vulnerability, Response Efficacy, Response Cost, Self-Efficacy, and Perceived Severity; and one dependent 
variable – i.e. User’s incident handling strategy adoption (see Figure 1). 
 
SA Level PMT Factors 
Perception Perceived vulnerability (PVUL) 
Comprehension Self-efficacy (SEF); Response 
efficacy (REF); Response cost (RCO) 
Projection Perceived severity (PSEV) 
Table 1: SA level and the relevance PMT factors 
  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model (integrating the Situation Awareness Model and Protection 
Motivation Theory) 
 
Perception involves the gathering of information, which creates knowledge of perceived cloud computing 
security and privacy threats such as potential threat actors, attack vector and target. It is accepted that 
cloud computing can introduce new security, privacy and trust risks and challenges, which reinforce the 
need for secure management of data (particularly in SaaS), privacy rules enforcement, and trust in CSP to 
do the right thing (Choo 2011, 2014). At this level, Perceived Vulnerability (PVUL) is the relevant factor 
and is defined as the CSU’s perception of a security threat to the cloud’s deployment. This will then lead to 
the adoption of an incident handling strategy. 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): Perceived vulnerability to incident occurrence is positively associated with the 
adoption of an incident handling strategy. 
 
Comprehension at the second level enables CSUs to understand and assess the current security and 
privacy risks, as well as the benefits and potential challenges of adopting the incident handling strategy. 
Self-Efficacy (SEF), Response Efficacy (REF), and Response Cost (RCO) are, therefore, the relevant 
factors that need to be implemented at the Comprehension level. SEF refers to the level of CSUs’ 
confidence to implement an incident handling strategy. REF is concerned with the perceived benefits of 
adopting incident handling strategy, and RCO refers to the inconvenience and other barriers in the 
adoption and implementation of an incident handling strategy. Examples of barriers including lack of 
support from senior management (Mitropoulos et al. 2006; Shedden et al. 2010; West-brown et al. 2003), 
and overly complicated procedures (Humaidi and Balakrishnan 2013). The hypotheses developed for 
these three factors are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Self-efficacy is positively related to the CSP’s incident handling strategy. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Response efficacy of incident handling in an organisation is positively related to the 
adoption of an incident handling strategy. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Perceived response costs of incident handling strategy are negatively related to its 
adoption. 
 
At the Projection level, assessments from the earlier levels inform CSU’s future incident handling strategy 
implementation. For instance, CSU would learn from previous implementation of an inefficient incident 
handling system (Bojanc 2013). Past studies have also indicated that perceived severity has a significant 
influence on user security behaviour (Ifinedo 2012; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Liang and Xue 2010; 
Ng et al. 2009). Therefore, we regard perceived severity (PSEV) as a relevant influencing factor for a CSU 
to adopt an incident handling strategy. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Perceived severity positively affects CSUs’ adoption of an incident handling 
strategy.  
Research Methodology 
Instrument Design 
A questionnaire was designed to collect data for this study (see Table 2), which was divided into four 
sections. The first part seeks general information on the adoption of cloud services in the participating 
organisation. The second part seeks information pertaining to the participant’s perceptions of cloud 
security and privacy threats. The third part is concerned with the participant’s perceptions of information 
security incident handling policy in their organisation, and the fourth part solicits responses about 
participant’s perceptions of their CSP information security incident handling strategies.  
 
SA 
Level 
Factor Item text  Measure Sources 
Pe
rc
ep
ti
on
 
                  
PVUL What is the likelihood of the following cloud 
specific threats facing your organisation? 
PVUL1 – Data breaches by insider 
PVUL2 – Data breaches by outsider 
PVUL3 – Data loss by insider 
PVUL4 – Data loss by outsider 
PVUL5 – Account or service traffic hijacking 
by insider 
PVUL6 – by outsider 
Most likely (1) to 
Not at all (5) 
(Cloud 
Security 
Alliance 2013); 
and Self-
developed 
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PVUL7 – Insecure software interfaces 
PVUL8 – Denial of service 
PVUL9 – Cloud service abuse by insider 
PVUL10 – Cloud service abuse by outsider 
PVUL11 – Inadequate due diligence 
PVUL12 – Shared technology vulnerabilities 
 What is the likelihood of the following threat 
vectors being exploited to target your 
organisation’s cloud services? 
PVUL13 – People 
PVUL14 – Process 
PVUL15 – Technologies 
Very high (1) to 
Very low (5) 
Self-developed 
CUE CUE1 – The content is updated regularly. 
CUE2 – My organisation organises regular 
workshop or seminar on information security 
and/or incident handling. 
Strongly agree (1) 
to Strongly 
disagree (5) 
Self-developed 
GEN GEN1 – My organisation’s information 
security incident handling policy is compliant 
with existing security management and 
incidents handling standard (e.g. ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 and ISO/IEC 27035:2011). 
GEN2 - The workshop or seminar increases 
my awareness on information security and/or 
incident handling. 
Strongly agree (1) 
to Strongly 
disagree (5) 
 
Least aware (1) to 
Mostly aware (5) 
Self-developed 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 C
om
pr
eh
en
si
on
 
      
SEF SEF1 — My organisation provides in-house 
technical support to handle information 
security incident. 
SEF2 — My organisation provides adequate 
in-house staff to handle information security 
incident. 
SEF3 — My organisation provides adequate 
budget to handle information security 
incident. 
Strongly agree (1) 
to Strongly 
disagree (5) 
Self-developed 
REF REF1 — The policy is adequate to handle 
non-cloud related information security 
incident(s) effectively. 
REF2 — The policy is adequate to handle 
cloud-related information security 
incident(s) effectively. 
REF3 — Based on my organisation’s 
experiences with the Cloud Service Provider, 
my organisation is confident with the Cloud 
Service Provider’s capability to handle an 
information security incident. 
Strongly agree (1) 
to Strongly 
disagree (5) 
Self-developed 
RCO What are the barriers to an effective 
information security incident handling policy 
Strongly agree (1) 
to Strongly 
(Killcrece et al. 
2003); and 
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implementation at your organisation? 
RCO1 - Incident handling procedures are too 
complex to be executed 
RCO2 - Lack of support from top 
management 
RCO3 - Lack of budget and other resources 
disagree (5) Self-developed 
   
  P
ro
je
ct
io
n 
PSEV What are the consequences of an ineffective 
information security incident handling policy 
to an organisation (i.e. cloud service user)? 
PSEV1 - Financial loss 
PSEV2 - Reputation damage 
PSEV3 - Legal implications 
Strongly agree (1) 
to Strongly 
disagree (5) 
(Killcrece et al. 
2003); and 
Self-developed 
 
Table 2: Measurement Items 
Data Collection 
A self-administered online survey was distributed to 100 organisational CSUs in Malaysia, which were 
identified in collaboration with MDeC. We had 40 responses, one from a different organisation.  We also 
conducted face-to-face interviews with four participants who had indicated on the questionnaire survey 
that they would like to participate in the follow-up interview. The interviews were conducted in the Malay 
language, and to ensure anonymity, the interviewees are referred as I1, I2, I3, and I4 in this paper (see 
Table 3).  
 
Industry Type 
Job Role 
IT Security Expert Cloud Project 
Manager 
Financial institution I1  
Education  I2 
ICT Services I3  
Audit, Tax, and Advisory 
Services 
I4  
Table 3: Interview Participants’ Information 
Data Analysis and Result 
Demographic Analysis 
As can be seen in Figure 2, the three main participating industry types were government agencies (30%), 
educational institutions such as universities (25%) and information and culture organisations such as IT 
service providers (22%).  
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Figure 2: Survey participant by industry type (n=40) 
 
The types of cloud deployment model reported by the participants are depicted in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slightly more than a third of the participants (and they are generally from government agencies and 
educational institutions) reported that their organisation is deploying private cloud (37.5%). A small 
number of participants (7.5%) reported that their organisations used more than one cloud models (i.e. 
both private and public cloud services are used by different departments within the organisation). Figure 
4 shows the breakdown of the cloud architecture in the participant’s organisation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Cloud deployment model reported by survey 
participants (n=40) 
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Figure 4: Cloud architecture reported by survey participants (n=40) 
 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is reportedly the most deployed architecture (~20%), although this 
number may be slightly higher as one of five participants reported that they did not know which cloud 
architecture are being used in their organisation.  
Construct Validity and Reliability Analysis 
Construct validity of the scale for measuring the independent variables was examined using Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA). EFA groups variables into a smaller set to facilitate analysis and interpretation. 
We used the Kaise-Mayer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s test to analyse the survey responses.  The KMO 
overall measure of sampling adequacy was 0.673, and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p 
<.05), indicating that the data is adequate and can be used for factor analysis. Using principle component 
analysis with Varimax rotation, the analysis generated a 5-factor solution, indicating approximately 80% 
of the total variance (eigenvalues greater than 1; see Table 4). A total of 16 items were loaded cleanly on 
the expected factors while the remaining items from Table 2 were omitted due to a low factor loading 
(<0.5).  
 
Factors Item text  Factor 
loading 
Eigenvalues % of 
Variance 
(1) Perceived 
vulnerability (α 
= 0.920) 
In your view, what is the likelihood 
of the following cloud specific 
threats faced by your organisation? 
 5.125 32.034 
Cloud service abuse by outsider 0.842 
Denial of service 0.813 
Data loss by outsider 0.807 
Inadequate due diligence 0.799 
Account or service traffic hijacking 
by outsider 
0.785 
Insecure software interfaces 0.769 
Data loss by insider 0.732 
Exploit people 0.718 
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(2) Response 
cost (α = 0.914) 
What are the barriers to an 
effective information security 
incident handling strategy 
implementation at your 
organisation? 
   
Lack of support from top 
management 
0.954 2.049 12.804 
Lack of budget 0.932 
(3) Perceived 
Severity (α = 
0.880) 
What are the consequences of an 
ineffective information security 
incident handling policy to your 
organisation (i.e. cloud service 
user)? 
 1.992 12.449 
Financial loss 0.918 
Legal implications 0.922 
(4) Self-efficacy 
(α = 0.810) 
My organisation provides adequate 
budget to handle information 
security incident. 
0.900 1.915 11.968 
My organisation provides adequate 
in-house staff to handle 
information security incident. 
0.761 
(5) Response 
efficacy (α = 
0.773) 
The policy is adequate to handle 
information security incident(s) on 
cloud environment efficiently. 
0.895 1.733 10.833 
The workshop or seminar increases 
my awareness on information 
security and/or incident handling. 
0.813 
 Cumulative % of Variance Values 80.087 
Table 4: Factor Loading based on Principle Component Analysis with Varimax (n=40) 
Cronbach’s alpha test was carried out for reliability analysis of the items in the constructs. In interpreting 
the alpha (α) value, items that exhibit α >.70 indicate good reliability of the constructs (Nunally 1978). 
The data shows that the overall reliability of Cronbach’s alpha reflects a high level of internal consistency 
(see Table 4). It can, therefore, be concluded that items used are valid and sufficiently reliable. We then 
proceed with the hypotheses testing using a Pearson Correlation Coefficient.  
Hypotheses Testing 
When the finalised constructs indicate acceptable validity and reliability, it is necessary to measure the 
strength and direction between the incident handling strategy adoption and each factor. A Pearson 
correlation was conducted to determine the statistical association between incident handling strategy 
adoption (IHSA) and the five PMT factors used in our model (PVUL, SEF, REF, RCO, and PSEV). Table 5 
presents the results of the bivariate correlation between the five factors and the test variable (IHSA).   
 
As previously hypothesised, PVUL did significantly affect IHSA at the 0.01 level (r=.424; n=40; p<.001) 
with a relatively moderate positive correlation. Thus, H1 was supported. Consistent with our expectations, 
SEF and IHSA were positively significant at the 0.01 level (r=.456; n=40; p<.001). The data analysis also 
reported that REF had a highly significant effect on IHSA at the 0.01 level (r=.564; n=40; p<.0001). 
Accordingly, H2 and H3 were supported. Surprisingly, RCO had an insignificant effect on IHSA (r=-0.112; 
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n=40; p=ns). Hence, H4 was not supported. Lastly, PSEV affected IHSA at the 0.05 level (r=0.334; n=40; 
p<.05) and, therefore, H5 was supported.  
 
Factor IHSA PVUL SEF REF RCO PSEV 
IHSA —      
PVUL .424** —     
SEF .456** .298 —    
REF .564** .003 .262 —   
RCO -.112 .211 -.081 -.123 —  
PSEV .343* .286 .000 .148 -.043 — 
Mean 1.83 3.13 2.50 2.17 3.08 1.85 
SD .712 1.265 .987 .844 1.118 .834 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table 5: Correlation coefficients and descriptive statistic (n=40) 
We then carried out a linear multiple regression analysis to predict IHSA based on a combination of PMT 
factors as independent variables. Collinearity diagnostic results show that multicollinearity for this 
regression is not a major concern. Tolerance scores were all above 0.01 with the lowest score being 0.810, 
and VIF scores were all below 10 with a highest score of 1.319. A significant regression equation was found 
(F (5, 34) = 9.245, p <.0001). The overall model fit was R2 = .576 (i.e. 57.6% of the variance in the global 
IHSA values). PVUL and REF were the only two variables in the model having a statistically significant 
effect on IHSA – see Table 6. 
 
Path β t-value Result 
PVUL .323 2.518 Supported 
SEF .230 1.857 Not-supported 
REF .465 3.926 Supported 
RCO -.096 -.826 Not-supported 
PSEV .178 1.488 Not-supported 
Table 6: Multiple Regression Model Predicting Incident Handling Strategy Adoption 
(n=40) 
Discussion 
Our study found that perceived vulnerability to have a significant effect on the adoption of a cloud 
incident handling strategy in the participant organisations. Our findings from the survey and the 
interviews echoed findings from previous studies, such as Ifinedo (2012) and Ng et al. (2009), which had 
found that perceived vulnerability influenced user behaviour. One of the interviewees (I1) also explained 
that his organisation opted for private cloud deployment due to concerns regarding the security and 
privacy of the organisational data and the uncertainty in the trustworthiness of the public CSP. For public 
CSUs who had to rely on their CSP’s incident handling strategy, the organisations would need to conduct 
appropriate due diligence (e.g. thoroughly examine their organisation’s and CSP’s security requirements) 
before migrating to the cloud service. Another interviewee (I2) explained that: 
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I2: “Before we migrated to the X system, we had to complete all sorts of security checks as well as 
conducting other due diligence measures” [Translated by authors] 
 
The awareness at the Perception level forms the knowledge basis required to proceed to the next level. 
 
Proposition 1: The more informed CSUs are regarding security and privacy risks associated with the use 
of the cloud, the greater their motivation to implement incident handling strategy within the organisation 
will be.  
 
Our results also suggest that Self-Efficacy and Response Efficacy at the Comprehension level significantly 
influenced the adoption of incident handling strategy, which are consistent with findings from previously 
published empirical studies such as in Siponen et al. (2014) and Vance et al. (2012). The importance of 
self-efficacy reported by the survey participants is, perhaps, due to the high number of private CSUs in our 
study. Generally, a reputable CSP known to have a reputation for complying with international security 
and privacy governance protocols can increase the user’s confidence and trust in the CSP (I2, I4). For 
instance, interview participant I4 reported that: 
 
I4: “Due to the reputation of the CSP, we trust our data with them as we believe that they will ensure 
the security and privacy of our data.” [Translated by authors] 
 
Interview participant I3 explains how their organisation can benefit by outsourcing their incident 
handling to a third-party vendor, such as a managed security service provider. Such an option may be 
more suited for SME-type organisation since it would not normally have the resources to adopt an 
effective incident handling strategy.  
 
I3: “Having an incident handling strategy will be useful for Managed Security Services (MSS) 
providers, as clients don’t need to know in detail the internal process of the vendor. This could result 
in significant savings, in terms of costs incident response time, and other resources.” [Translated by 
authors] 
 
Our findings did not indicate that Response Cost had a significant influence on the adoption of incident 
handling strategy. Similar observation was also reported in previous research, such as those of Ifinedo 
(2012) and Meso et al. (2013). Interview participant I2, when asked about barriers encountered during 
the implementation of incident handling strategy in his organisation, explained that:   
 
I2: “No, I don’t think we have encountered any barriers. We are fine as we haven’t had any security 
incidents… So I think it should be quite straight forward to report an incident if we have one. ” 
[Translated by authors] 
 
More than half of the survey participants (60%) also reported that they were not aware of any cloud-
related incident. This could be due to the fact that incidents were undetected or unreported.  
 
At the Comprehension level, our findings indicated that the participants understand the benefits of 
implementing an incident handling strategy to minimise security risks, and are able to assess their 
capability in undertaking the strategy.  
 
It also appeared that  perceived severity influenced the adoption of incident handling strategy within the 
organisation, and similar findings are reported by Siponen et al. (2014) and Ifinedo (2012). As an example 
of an ineffective strategy, weak enforcement of authentication policy would likely increase the potential of 
a data breach incident and, consequently, affect the confidentiality and integrity of the organisational 
data, as well as resulting in significant reputational and financial damages. In addition, the cost involved 
in post-incident damage control should be taken into consideration by the organisation to ensure that 
there is an effective strategy, as described by one interview participant. 
 
I4: “If we do not have an incident handling strategy, a major security breach would require a 
significant effort and cost in the damage control exercise, and in our Internet-connected 
organisation, any security breaches resulting in compromise of company data will have a significant 
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long-term impact for us. For example, the high profile iCloud security breach taught us a lesson. 
Even if we managed to tighten our security system after the incident has been detected, there is 
absolutely nothing we can do to recover the stolen data or prevent the dissemination of the stolen 
data.” [Translated by authors] 
 
This study, therefore, proposes the following propositions,  
   
Proposition 2 (a): CSUs are more likely to adopt incident handling strategy when they are confident in 
their capability to implement the strategy.  
 
Proposition 2 (b): CSUs are more likely to adopt incident handling strategy when they understand the 
benefits of undertaking the strategy. 
 
Proposition 2 (c): CSUs are more likely to adopt incident handling strategy when they can understand 
the severity of a situation due to an inefficient or ineffective strategy.  
 
The regression analysis also determined that Perceived Vulnerability and Response Efficacy were 
significant factors in influencing the adoption of an incident handling strategy by the participants. We, 
therefore, suggest that a successful adoption of an incident handling strategy by an organisational CSU 
involves the nexus between Perceived Vulnerability, Self-Efficacy, Response Efficacy, and Perceived 
Severity.  
Proposition 3: Overall, CSU’s adoption of incident handling strategy is influenced by their perceived 
vulnerability of cloud security, perceived severity of cloud incidents, and the self-efficacy and benefits of 
the adopting and implementing the strategy. 
Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper highlighted the importance of having an incident handling strategy for organisational cloud 
service users, particularly to ensure the security and privacy of their organisational data. We proposed a 
conceptual model (an integration of the Situation Awareness model and Protection Motivation Theory) to 
guide us in identifying influencing factors in the adoption of an incident handling strategy by 
organisational cloud service users. Based on our survey and interviews of participants from 40 different 
organisations in Malaysia, we determined that Perceived Vulnerability, Self-Efficacy, Response Efficacy, 
and Perceived Severity are factors that have a significant influence on the adoption of an incident 
handling strategy by organisation cloud service users. 
However, the responses were small in number, by comparison to the number of organisational cloud 
service users in Malaysia; therefore, the findings may not be generalisable. Future work would include 
conducting the study on a larger scale within the country, which would provide a statistically sound 
national data. Future study would also include the refinement of the measurement items (e.g. considering 
cloud deployment and service models as the moderator or control variables ) and the conceptual model 
(e.g. by integrating constructs and variables from other theoretical models) so that the model is more 
robust.  
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